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INTRODUCTION
Child abusers, compulsive gamblers, kleptomaniacs, pedophiles, and
others who know they are breaking the law but are unable to resist their im-
pulses may get a break if they are sentenced in federal court. This is the re-
sult of a 1997 Third Circuit decision in which the court held that a defen-
dant's "volitional impairment" may justify a reduction in sentencing, even if
the defendant knew what she was doing, and knew that it was wrong.
1
More specifically, the court ruled that a defendant's lack of self-control
could serve as an independent basis for downward departure from the Fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines (the "Guidelines") pursuant to section 5K2.13,
which authorizes departures due to reduced mental capacity.2 As of No-
vember 1, 1998, the U. S. Sentencing Commission (the "Commission") of-
ficially endorsed this approach.3
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1 See United States v. McBroom, 124 F.3d 533, 544 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that a
downward departure may be justified for defendants who cannot control themselves); Matt
Ackermann, Lack of Control May Warrant Shorter Term, Court Rules, N.J.L.J., Sept. 8, 1997,
at 5 (reporting general concerns over the Third Circuit's decision to consider volitional im-
pairment as possible grounds for downward departure in sentencing).
2 See McBroom, 124 F.3d at 544 ("We believe that a defendant's ability to control his or
her own conduct is a relevant consideration when determining the defendant's eligibility for a
downward departure pursuant to section 5K2.13!"); see also U.S. SENTENCiNG GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 5K2.13 (1994) ("If the defendant committed a non-violent offense while suffering
from significantly reduced mental capacity not resulting from the use of drugs or other intoxi-
cants, a lower sentence may be warranted to reflect the extent to which reduced mental capac-
ity contributed to the commission of the offense... !).
3 See U.S. Sentencing Commission, Sentencing Guidelines (May 18, 1998), Amendment
No. 8, at 25-26, available in U.S. Sentencing Commission Homepage (last modified May 27,
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Consider the facts of the Third Circuit case. Kenneth McBroom, 4 a
practicing attorney, pled guilty to, and was convicted of, one count of pos-
session of child pornography.5 McBroom had access to a wealth of porno-
graphic images from the Internet, which he would download and store for
his personal collection. 6  About one month prior to the execution of the
search warrant for his home that ultimately led to his arrest, McBroom
learned that his on-line activities were under investigation by the FBI; yet,
he did not cease or even curb his conduct.
7
Following the entry of his plea, McBroom admitted that he fully under-
stood the moral and legal implications of his activities at the time he en-
gaged in them. Nevertheless, he moved in federal district court for a
downward departure from his mandated sentence on the theory that he was
volitionally impaired and therefore could not control himself.9 Reasoning
that a departure pursuant to section 5K2.13 is unavailable absent any indi-
cation that the defendant was unable to process information or to reason,10
1998) <http:llwww.ussc.gov/pdf/98amend2.pdf> (noting that the amendment to section
5K2.13 adds an application note based on the decision in McBroom).
4 McBroom's personal background adds profoundly disturbing overtones to the case. As
a child, he suffered years of sexual abuse at the hands of his father, a trauma that undoubtedly
altered the course of his life. Despite enjoying an outwardly successful career, McBroom en-
dured bouts with drugs and alcohol as an adult. Several attempts at building a stable family
life failed, each ending in divorce. He admitted to having a long-term fascination with peep
shows and pornography as a result of his childhood abuse, and his states of depression have
led him to take measures as drastic as self-mutilation. See McBroom, 124 F.3d at 535-37.
5 See id. at 534. McBroom's federal grand jury indictment initially charged him with
three counts: "[O]ne count of knowingly transporting child pornography in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1), one count of knowingly receiving child pornography in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), and one count of knowingly possessing child pornography in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)." Id. at 537. McBroom pled guilty to count three. See id.
6 See id. at 536-37. His collection included "'bestiality, masochism, bondage and every
imaginable sexual fetish."' Id. at 537 (quoting from McBroom's affidavit). About 25% of the
images McBroom downloaded constituted child pornography. See id. at 537.
See id. (noting McBroom's activities despite his awareness of the FBI surveillance); see
also United States v. McBroom, 991 F. Supp. 445, 449 (D.N.J. 1998) (reasoning, on remand,
that "[e]ven when [McBroom] learned that the FBI was investigating him, he could not bring
himself to simply delete the pornographic pictures from his computer").
8 See McBroom, 124 F.3d at 541 ("McBroom does not argue that the district court erred
when it found that he is able to absorb information in the usual way and to exercise the power
of reason.").
9 See id. at 534-35 ("McBroom contends that the abuse he endured as a child caused him
to suffer from a significantly reduced mental capacity such that he felt compelled to possess
child pornography .... "). McBroom argued that he suffered from reduced mental capacity
within the meaning of section 5K2.13 because he was diagnosed with an "Impulse Control
Disorder" which made him out-of-control. See id. at 540.
10 See id. (restating the district court's conclusion that "'a defendant able to absorb in-
formation in the usual way and to exercise the power of reason is not suffering from a signifi-
cantly reduced mental capacity under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13.' (quoting United States v. Johnson,
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the district court denied the motion.1 On appeal, McBroom argued that the
sentencing judge took too narrow a view of that section and thereby im-
properly excluded certain individuals who, although able to absorb infor-
mation in the usual way and to exercise the power of reason, are neverthe-
less incapable of controlling their behavior and conforming to the law.1
2
The Third Circuit agreed.
13
The McBroom decision, and the wholesale endorsement of its logic by
the Commission, 14 are significant events because they raise many important
979 F.2d 396, 401 (6th Cir. 1992))). In fact, this is how most existing case law had inter-
preted section 5K2.13 prior to McBroom. See infra notes 190-201 and accompanying text
(distinguishing the Third Circuit's holding from the treatment of volitional impairment by the
D.C., Fourth, and Sixth Circuits).
See McBroom, 124 F.3d at 540. It should be noted that McBroom's sentence had al-
ready been adjusted downward in accordance with his acceptance of responsibility. Moreo-
ver, although the pre-sentence report recommended an increase because the material involved
a minor, the district court did not apply this upward adjustment. See id. at 537 & n.3 (noting
that the district court "granted a two-point downward adjustment for acceptance of responsi-
bility," but did not apply the two-point upward adjustment, recommended in the pre-sentence
report, for the possession of material involving minors under the age of 12).
12 See id. at 541 (noting McBroom's claim that the term "significantly reduced mental
capacity," as used in section 5K2.13, should not exclude "individuals who, while able to ab-
sorb information in the usual way and to exercise the power of reason, are incapable of con-
trolling their behavior and conforming it to the law").
13 The court concluded that:
We believe that the following test adequately addresses our concerns that a sentenc-
ing court consider both a defendant's cognitive capacity and his or her volitional ca-
pacity when considering a downward departure pursuant to section 5K2.13: A per-
son may be suffering from a 'reduced mental capacity' ... if either:
(1) the person is unable to absorb information in the usual way or to exercise the
power of reason; or
(2) the person knows what he is doing and that it is wrong but cannot control his
behavior or conform it to the law.
The first prong permits sentencing courts to consider defects of cognition. The
second prong permits courts to consider defects of volition. Sentencing courts
must consider both prongs before making a determination about a defendant's
"reduced mental capacity."
Id. at 548 (emphasis added).
After creating this formulation, the Third Circuit vacated the district court's original sen-
tence and remanded the case for resentencing. See id. at 551. On remand, the district court
applied the new standard and concluded that McBroom's traumatic childhood experiences did
warrant a downward departure. See United States v. McBroom, 991 F. Supp. 445, 447
(D.N.J. 1998). The original 15-month sentence was reduced to six months in federal prison,
plus three months of house arrest. See id. at 451; see also Jerry DeMarco, Sentence Reduced
in Net Porn Case, RECORD (BERGEN, N.J.), Jan. 14, 1998, at A2.
14 The Commission has considered adding a volitional prong to section 5K2.13 previ-
ously, but rejected the idea on multiple occasions. See, e.g., U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for
United States Courts, 63 Fed. Reg. 602, 632 (1998) (proposing an amendment to section
5K2.13 without adding a volitional prong). The Commission's sudden reversal appears to be
based almost exclusively on the Third Circuit's reasoning in McBroom. See Written State-
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questions that have not been explored adequately within the context of fed-
eral sentencing: Given that volitional impairment is not considered for pur-
poses of an affirmative insanity defense in federal cases,15 are there reasons
to preclude it from being a factor in sentencing? Would allowing section
5K2.13 departures based on volitional impairment advance or hinder Con-
gress's objectives in promulgating the Guidelines? Could such departures
be justified under any moral theory of punishment or responsibility? If vo-
litional impairment should not be a basis for section 5K2.13 departures,
what alternatives are available in cases like McBroom? This Comment ad-
dresses these questions and others, including the most important and diffi-
cult question of all: What does it really mean to say that someone is voli-
tionally impaired?
This Comment argues that it is incorrect to base section 5K2.13 depar-
tures on a defendant's volitional impairment. Most cases associated with
volitional impairment, when properly analyzed, actually involve a perfectly
functioning will and voluntary action. As a result, as long as the defendant
is not irrational, unmitigated punishment is morally appropriate. Further-
more, allowing departures based on volitional impairment would frustrate
Congress's objectives for the Guidelines, especially the objective of nation-
wide uniformity in sentencing. In light of these concerns, a better approach
would be to allow section 5K2.13 departures only under the traditional stan-
dard for reduced mental capacity, namely, when the defendant lacks the
ability to reason and to distinguish right from wrong.
Part I summarizes the debate over volitional impairment within the
context where it first gained national prominence-the federal insanity de-
fense. Part II discusses the goals of federal sentencing generally and ex-
plores the extent to which considering volitional impairment as a factor for
section 5K2.13 departures is compatible with these goals. Part III clarifies
several major misconceptions regarding volitional impairment and develops
a clearer understanding of what it truly means to say that one is "out-of-
control," or volitionally impaired. Finally, Part IV concludes by rejecting
volitional impairment as a basis for section 5K2.13 departures. This Part
proposes that, as long as defendants are able to rationally reflect upon their
conduct, it is appropriate and necessary that they be given unmitigated sen-
tences.
ments of Witnesses from Mar. 12, 1998 Public hearing on Proposed Amendments to the Sen-
tencing Guidelines, available in U.S. Sentencing Commission Homepage (visited Feb. 25,
1999) <http//www.ussc.gov/hearings.htm> (indicating a conspicuous lack of public debate on
the McBroom proposal for section 5K2.13).
15 See infra note 28 and accompanying text (explaining that a volitional prong to the in-
sanity defense has been rejected for federal purposes by the Insanity Defense Reform Act of
1984 § 402(a), 18 U.S.C. § 17 (1988)).
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I. THE BACKDROP: VOLITIONAL IMPAIRMENT AND THE INSANITY DEFENSE
IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
The concept of volitional impairment first gained prominence in the law
as a key aspect of the alternative standard to the M'Naghten test for legal
insanity. In that context, where its vices and virtues have been robustly de-
bated, volitional impairment was ultimately rejected by the federal courts.
Any inquiry into potentially valid grounds for such departures necessarily
inherits much from this prior debate because departures pursuant to section
5K2.13 are intended to mitigate for a defendant's reduced mental capacity.
Accordingly, a brief review of the history of the insanity defense in the fed-
eral courts is a logical place to begin to determine the proper role for voli-
tional impairment in federal sentencing.
The classic substantive test for insanity was established in 1843 in
Daniel M'Naghten's Case.16 Under M'Naghten, legal insanity involves a
disturbance or disease of the mind whereby the defendant did not appreciate
the "nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he
did not know he was doing what was wrong.' 17 Under this well-established
standard,18 a defendant's lack of self-control is completely irrelevant to the
determination of legal insanity, because only the cognitive ability to distin-
guish right from wrong matters.
Although it remains vibrant today, the M'Naghten test has endured
much criticism. 19 Some critics have observed, for example, that the human
psyche is an 'integrated entity of cognition and affect,"' and that other
symptoms besides the inability to reason might constitute reduced mental
capacity. Thus, in 1955, the American Law Institute (the "ALI") formu-
lated a novel test for insanity that seemed to address some of M'Naghten's
major perceived weaknesses. This new standard retained the cognitive
analysis prescribed under M'Naghten, but it also added a so-called voli-
16 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
17 Id. at 722.
19 See SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
PROCESSES 932 (6th ed. 1995) (characterizing the M'Naghten test as the "traditional test of
legal insanity").
19 See MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE 78-84
(1994) (discussing attacks on the M'Naghten test).
20 Id. at 82 (quoting Donald H.J. Herman & Yvonne S. Sor, Convicting or Confining?
Alternative Directions in Insanity Law Reform: Guilty but Mentally 11 Versus New Rules for
Release oflnsanityAcquittees, 1983 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 449, 512). Lianne C. Scherr, a nationally
recognized psychiatrist and sentencing mitigation specialist, has enthusiastically embraced
McBroom along these lines. See Alan Ellis, Let Judges Be Judges! Downward Departures
After Koon, 12 CRIM. JUST. 49 (1998) (quoting Scherr, who noted that "[i]t is a relief to again
be able to argue that some criminal behavior is the result of mental illness").
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tional component which focused on the defendant's ability to control her
behavior.
21
The ALI's new approach was incorporated into the Model Penal Code
(the "MPC"). In jurisdictions that adopted the MPC, a defendant was not
responsible by reason of insanity if, "as a result of mental disease or defect,
he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongful-
ness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the
law."22 Thus, an affirmative insanity defense could now be based either on
the inability to reason, or, alternatively, on some inability to control one's
actions.
The MPC test initially represented a viable alternative to the M'Naghten
test. When ajury acquitted John W. Hinckley, Jr. in 1982 on the grounds of
insanity,23 however, many jurisdictions balked.24 A period of intense na-
tionwide pressure to limit the scope of the insanity defense ensued,25 and
eventually the MPC test came under serious scrutiny.26 In 1984, the Fifth
Circuit concluded that, for purposes of pleading the insanity defense to fed-
eral offenses, volitional impairment should be completely disregarded. The
court reasoned that the volitional prong of the MPC standard was inapplica-
ble because "a majority of psychiatrists now believe that they do not possess
sufficient accurate scientific bases for measuring a person's capacity for
self-control or for calibrating the impairment of that capacity."
27
21 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955) ("A person is not re-
sponsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct he lacks substantial capacity ei-
ther to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements
of the law.").
22 Id. § 4.01(1) (emphasis added).
23 See United States v. Hinckley, 529 F. Supp. 520 (D.D.C. 1982) (finding Hinckley not
guilt by reason of insanity for the attempted murder of then-President Ronald Reagan).
The acquittal of John Hinckley shocked and angered the American public. Three days
after the jury's verdict, The New York Times referred to a "national reaction of stunned sur-
prise" and a "cascade of public outrage." Stuart Taylor Jr., The Hinckley Riddle, N.Y. TIMES,
June 24, 1982, at D21 (reporting on the public furor following Hinckley's acquittal). This
case "abruptly reversed" the trend in favor of the MPC approach.
25 See PERLIN, supra note 19, at 13-30 (discussing the public furor over the Hinckley
case during this period).
26 Today, a majority of the states employ the M'Naghten test exclusively, but a sizable
minority retain the MPC approach. See KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 18, at 948, 953-
55 (discussing legal developments in the aftermath of Hinckley's acquittal).
27 United States v. Lyons, 731 F.2d 243, 248 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc). This observation
has since been affirmed by Professor Stephen Morse in an analysis of irresistible impulses and
related crimes. He notes that:
No established metric exists to determine the magnitude of impulses, desires, or
feelings.... mhe [psychological] studies do not address, and folk psychology does
not know, whether and to what degree people are unable to refrain from acting.
Neither in psychology [nor in philosophy]... is there a reasonably uncontroversial
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Ultimately, Congress agreed with the Fifth Circuit. In 1984, it enacted
the Insanity Defense Reform Act (the "IDRA"),28 which established the
M'Naghten, or cognitive ability test, as the exclusive standard for legal in-
sanity in federal cases. Today, if charged with a federal crime, a defendant
may not raise volitional impairment as part of an affirmative insanity de-
fense during the guilt phase of her trial.
II. SENTENCING'S GOALS AND OBJECTIVES: VOLITIONAL IMPAIRMENT
BEYOND THE INSANITY DEFENSE
Although discarded for the purposes of a federal insanity defense, it
does not necessarily follow that volitional impairment should play no role in
sentencing. 29 Instead, whether a defendant's ability to control her behavior
should factor into sentencing decisions depends primarily upon Congress's
purposes in enacting the Guidelines.
understanding of these matters.... The strongest contrary claims in the literature
fail both conceptually and empirically.
Stephen J. Morse, Culpability and Control, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1587, 1657-58 (1994).
28 The IDRA was passed as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984. It
states, in relevant part:
It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under any Federal statute that, at the
time of the commission of the acts constituting the offense, the defendant, as a result
of a severe mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature and quality
or the wrongfulness of his acts. Mental disease or defect does not otherwise consti-
tute a defense.
18 U.S.C. § 17(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
29 One commentator has recently argued that the interpretation of the insanity defense
and the Guidelines are inextricably interrelated. She claims that the IDRA's rejection of voli-
tional impairment during the guilt phase of federal criminal proceedings "evidences Congress'
vehement objection to an analysis of a defendant's ability to exercise self-control." Kelly A.
Herten, Comment, Downward Departure Under the Federal Sentencing: Lack of Self-Control
as Grounds for Departure After United States v. McBroom, 102 DICK. L. REV. 649, 668
(1998). However, this argument exaggerates the logical connection between the IDRA's pur-
poses and the goals and objectives in sentencing. It seems clear from the legislative history
that Congress's main concern in passing the IDRA was that the volitional insanity defense
cannot be reliably administered at trial, because of inherent problems with distinguishing
those unable to conform to the law from those unwilling to do so. See S. Rep. No. 98-225, at
228 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3410 ("'The line between an irresistible
impulse and an impulse not resisted is probably no sharper than that between twilight and
dusk."' (quoting the American Psychiatric Association Statement on the Insanity Defense, at
14 (Dec. 1982))); see also supra note 27. The main worry was the effect that this ambiguity
might have on jurors. "However, because federal sentencing is entrusted to judges, not juries,
the sentencing context does not implicate the administrability and reliability concerns as
deeply as the trial context does." Criminal Law-Federal Sentencing Guidelines-Third Cir-
cuit Holds That Volitional Impairments Can Support a Claim of Diminished Mental Capac-
ity-United States v. McBroom, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1122, 1125 (1998).
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A. The Role of Sentencing and Departures Generally
The Guidelines are the result of over twenty years of intense debate
concerning the best system for punishing federal offenders.30 Prior to the
Guidelines, an indeterminate sentencing and parole structure existed for
most of the century that allowed judges broad discretion to tailor sentences
based on the specific circumstances of each offender. Indeterminate sen-
tencing was based primarily on the desire to rehabilitate offenders, thereby
minimizing the risks of renewed criminal activity upon their unsupervised
returns to society.
However, indeterminate sentencing had one major drawback. The sys-
tem created significant disparities in federal sentencing practices nation-
wide.31 In 1984, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act ("SRA")32 in
response to this prevalent concern. The SRA was designed to "overhaul a
system that was plagued by inequality and uncertainty."
33
As part of the SRA, Congress created the Commission and authorized it
to issue, and subsequently monitor, the Guidelines.34  Through this new
system of determinate sentencing, Congress established a far more struc-
tured sentencing regime than had existed previously. Rehabilitation was no
longer the sole objective to be achieved through sentencing. Rather, Con-
gress provided for the development of the Guidelines to "further [all of] the
basic purposes of criminal punishment: deterrence, incapacitation, just
punishment, and rehabilitation.
3 5
In furtherance of Congress's broad goals, the Commission stated its
own objectives for sentencing reform, framed in terms of Congress's man-
date: "provid[ing] certainty and fairness in... sentencing, avoiding unwar-
30 See MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 6-24 (1996) (detailing twenty-five years
of fervor over sentencing); Theresa Walker Karle & Thomas Sager, Are the Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines Meeting Congressional Goals?: An Empirical and Case Law Analysis, 40
EMORY L.J. 393, 393-94 (1991) (highlighting events in the sentencing debate over the past
century).
31 See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1938, 1944 (1988) ("The most frequent criticism of
the broad discretion afforded federal judges in sentencing was that it led to disparate treatment
for similarly situated individuals, a conclusion bolstered by a number of studies of sentencing
patterns.").
32 The SRA is codified principally at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-85, 3673, 3742 (1988), and 28
U.S.C. §§ 991-98 (1988).
33 Honorable Bruce M. Selya & Matthew R. Kipp, An Examination of Emerging Depar-
ture Jurisprudence Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 67 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1, 3
(1991).
34 The Guidelines are codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (1988).
35 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, Intro. ("The Statutory Mission")
(1994) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (1988)).
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ranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who
have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct[, and] maintaining suffi-
cient flexibility to permit individualized sentences when warranted ....
Uniformity in sentencing thus was an overarching objective of the new
sentencing structure. This was not to be accomplished rigidly, or without
exceptions.37 The actual operation of the Guidelines illustrates that both
Congress and the Commission recognized the need for occasional variations
in sentencing. For example, "sentencing courts are to treat each guideline as
carving out a 'heartland,' [that is,] a set of typical cases embodying the con-
duct that each guideline describes." 38 Upward and downward adjustments
within each range are allowed to account for certain pre-approved offender
and offense characteristics.
39
36 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (1988).
37 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, Intro. ("The Basic Approach
(Policy Statement)") (1994) ("Relevant distinctions not reflected in the guidelines probably
will occur rarely and sentencing courts may take such unusual cases into account by departing
from the guidelines.").
38 Selya & Kipp, supra note 33, at 11.
39 The mechanics of the actual sentencing process can be summarized as follows: At the
core of the Guidelines is a sentencing grid, composed of forty-three offense ["base levels"] on
the vertical axis and six criminal history categories on the horizontal axis. At the confluence
of each offense level and criminal history category is a sentencing range. In determining the
appropriate range to apply, the sentencing court must first look to the base level offense under
which the defendant has been convicted. The base level offense will often call for upward or
downward adjustments depending on the existence of specific offense characteristics (such as
the amount of money involved in cases of fraud or the use of a firearm in a robbery). Id. at 6.
Next, ... the [sentencing court] must determine whether additional base level
adjustments are appropriate [in light of more offender-specific factors]. These [will]
relate to (1) the victim's characteristics, (2) the defendant's role in the offense, (3)
whether the defendant obstructed justice, (4) the incidence of multiple counts, and
(5) whether the defendant accepted responsibility for his actions....
Equipped with the defendant's total base offense level and criminal history cate-
gory, [the court may determine the applicable sentencing range]. If the interim cal-
culations were properly performed, the imposition of a final sentence within the
sentencing range may not be reviewed on appeal.
In deciding the actual sentence [within the applicable range] to be imposed,
[however,] the court must consider a number of [additional] factors prescribed by
Congress. They include the seriousness of the offense, deterrence, public protec-
tion, .. . policy statements of the Sentencing Commission, and avoidance of unwar-
ranted disparities in sentencing. Having [considered all of] these factors, the court
[will] select a sentence from within the sentencing range.
Id. at 6-8 (footnotes omitted).
If ever warranted by unusual circumstances, a sentencing court may impose a sentence
outside the range prescribed by the guidelines. This practice is called a departure. Depending
on whether the Commission has taken a position on the particular circumstances involved,
departures may be either "guided" or "unguided" by official policy statements. See id. at 11-
12.
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When a sentencing court is faced with a truly atypical case, a departure
may be warranted. Departures constitute a sentence imposed outside the
prescribed sentencing range. They are justified under the principle that le-
niency4° is appropriate in such cases, and are generally available only when
"there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a de-
gree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission
in formulating the Guidelines.'
'4
Departures illustrate that the concepts of leniency and mitigation are not
inconsistent with determinate sentencing under the Guidelines. The only
prerequisites for a valid departure are that the purported grounds for de-
parting have not been specifically precluded by the Commission, and that
such grounds serve Congress's overall objectives in enacting the Guidelines.
Accordingly, the Guidelines detail several factors that the Commission has
adequately considered and thereby excluded as valid grounds for depar-
ture,42 as well as other factors that it has yet to fully develop and which
therefore remain "unguided.,4
3
Until recently, trial court discretion regarding departures was limited in
many jurisdictions. In some circuits, the trial courts' discretion was limited
to merely proposing bright-line rules to the circuit court which, if adopted,
became standards for future operation-the equivalent of judicial amend-
ments to the Guidelines." In 1996, the Supreme Court decided Koon v.
United States,45 which for the first time provided guidance to the district
courts regarding their discretion to grant departures. Koon requires that
each case be decided on its individual merits. Proposed departures may no
longer be categorically restricted unless the Guidelines themselves have
40 In McBroom, for example, the Third Circuit contended that the principles of leniency
that underlie sentencing departures for cognitive impairments "apply with equal force
to... those who cannot control their behavior." 124 F.3d 548, 533 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing
United States v. Weddle, 30 F.3d 532, 540 (4th Cir. 1994)).
41 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988). The SRA limits the sentencing court's ability to examine
what cases are "of a kind" or "to a degree not adequately taken into consideration." In making
this review, a sentencing court may only look to the Guidelines themselves, policy statements,
and official commentary by the Commission. See id.; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 5K2.0, Other Grounds for Departure (Policy Statement) (providing an overview
of sentencing departure decisions).
42 See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINEs MANUAL §§ 5Hl.1-5Hl.10 (1994) (noting
that race, sex, national origin, and religion can never be bases for departure, and suggesting
that age and family ties, among other factors, are generally not relevant).
43 See, e.g., id. §§ 5K2.1-5K2.16 (listing numerous factors that may provide a proper ba-
sis for departure).
44 See, e.g., United States v. Higgins, 967 F.2d 841, 845 (3d Cir. 1992); United States v.
Wogan, 938 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (Ist Cir. 1991); United States v. Joyner, 924 F.2d 454, 459-
61 (2d Cir. 1981).
45 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
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specifically precluded them as not involving an appropriate sentencing con-
sideration.46 After Koon, sentencing judges have greater discretion to con-
sider departures than ever before under a determinate sentencing regime.
B. Section 5K2.13: Reduced Mental Capacity Departures
Section 5K2.13 of the Guidelines provides one potential basis for de-
partures that the Commission has not adequately considered; departures un-
der this section are unguided. It authorizes departures from the prescribed
sentencing range where a defendant can demonstrate that she suffers from
"significantly reduced mental capacity. ' 47
Section 5K2.13 was recently revised primarily to address a circuit split
regarding whether this particular type of departure is precluded if the defen-
dant committed a "crime of violence," as that term is defined in the career
offender guideline.!8 It now provides as follows:
A sentence below the applicable guideline range may be warranted if the de-
fendant committed the offense while suffering from a significantly reduced
mental capacity. However, the court may not depart below the applicable
guideline range if (1) the significantly reduced mental capacity was caused by
voluntary use of drugs or other intoxicants; (2) the facts and circumstances of
the defendant's offense indicate a need to protect the public because the of-
fense involved actual violence or a serious threat of violence; or (3) the defen-
dant's criminal history indicates a need to incarcerate the defendant to protect
the public. If a departure is warranted, the extent of the departure should re-
flect the extent to which the reduced mental capacity contributed to the com-
mission of the offense.
49
The Commission did not stop its overhaul of section 5K2.13 there,
however. For the first time, the Commission added an application note to
this section. Because the standard "significantly reduced mental capacity"
had not previously been defined by the Guidelines,0 this application note
46 See id. at 94 ("Mhe [Sentencing Reform] Act authorizes district courts to depart in
cases that feature aggravating or mitigating circumstances of a kind or degree not adequately
taken into consideration by the Commission.").
47 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.13 (1994)
48 See U.S. Sentencing Commission, Sentencing Guidelines (May 18, 1998), Amendment
No. 8, at 25, available in U.S. Sentencing Commission Homepage (last modified May 27,
1998) <http://www.ussc.gov/pdf/98amend2.pdf> (addressing the circuit split that existed be-
tween the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits on the one hand, and the D.C., Third, and Fourth
Circuits on the other, prior to the recent amendments to section 5K2.13).
49 Id. at 26-27; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINEs MANUAL § 5K2.13 (LEXIS
through Nov. 12, 1998 Amendments).
United States v. McBroom, 124 F.3d 533, 54448 (3d Cir. 1997) (discussing the vari-
ous interpretations of "significantly reduced mental capacity").
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was specifically intended to define that term in accord with the decision in
McBroom.51 The application note provides:
For purposes of this policy statement-
"Significantly reduced mental capacity" means the defendant, although con-
victed, has a significantly impaired ability to (A) understand the wrongfulness
of the behavior comprising the offense or to exercise the Rower of reason; or
(B) control behavior that the defendant knows is wrongful.
Reduced mental capacity under the previous section 5K2.13 53 had been
traditionally established by showing that the defendant was unable to reason
or to absorb information in the usual way.54 Yet, the Commission has de-
cided specifically to include both cognitive and volitional types of impair-
ments within the scope of the new section 5K2.13.
The United States Supreme Court has upheld the primacy of the Com-
mission over the federal courts in determining the proper grounds for de-
parture under the Guidelines' ranges.55 Moreover, there is no conceptual
barrier that prohibits establishing the existence of reduced mental capacity
through volitional impairment. The fact that this standard has been rejected
for purposes of the federal insanity defense 56 is not necessarily conclusive
evidence that it should not be applied in sentencing. Indeed, determining a
defendant's appropriate punishment is an analytical question distinct from
deciding guilt.
s See Amendment No. 8 to Sentencing Guidelines, at 26 (noting that "[t]he amendment
also adds an application note that defines 'significantly reduced mental capacity' in accord
with the decision in United States v. McBroom").
52 Id. at 27.
53 Section 5K2.13 previously provided:
If the defendant committed a non-violent offense while suffering from significantly
reduced mental capacity not resulting from voluntary use of drugs or other intoxi-
cants, a lower sentence may be warranted to reflect the extent to which reduced
mental capacity contributed to the commission of the offense, provided that the de-
fendant's criminal history does not indicate a need for incarceration to protect the
public.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.13 (1994).
54 This is essentially the M'Naghten, or cognitive ability, test for insanity. See supra Part
I (describing the MNaghten cognitive ability test which questions the ability to distinguish
right from wrong); see also supra note 10 and accompanying text (noting that all circuits that
had ruled on sentencing departures pursuant to section 5K2.13 prior to McBroom have applied
the cognitive ability standard).
55 See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 106 (1996) (noting that "Congress did not
grant federal circuits authority to decide what sorts of sentencing considerations are inappro-
priate" and indicating that such decisions are up to the Sentencing Commission).
See supra note 28 and accompanying text (establishing that a defendant may not raise
volitional impairment as part of a federal insanity defense).
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Thus, understanding why the Commission's decision to endorse the
Third Circuit's logic in McBroom is misguided does not depend on any lack
of authority or logical weakness in the Commission's approach. Rather, the
real concern involves the many practical problems that flow from the severe
confusion that currently abounds regarding what it means to be "volitionally
impaired. 's In most cases, the term is used carelessly to pardon conduct
that is not truly involuntary action, and that is therefore unworthy of any
mercy. Accordingly, before we can effectively dismiss volitional impair-
ment as a valid basis for section 5K2.13 sentencing departures, it is neces-
sary to develop a better understanding of what it truly means to be volition-
ally impaired.
In order to clarify the concept of volitional impairment, a key threshold
issue is whether a defendant who asserts this impairment deserves leniency
in the same way that an irrational, or cognitively impaired, defendant de-
serves such treatment. This issue, in turn, depends upon two considerations:
whether volitional impairment truly leads to involuntary action, as the term
suggests, and whether expanding the standard for section 5K2.13 departures
to include a volitional factor would advance Congress's main objectives for
sentencing reform.
58
III. UNDERSTANDING VOLITIONAL IMPAIRMENT: WHAT IT MEANS
To BE "OUT OF CONTROL"
In colloquial terms, to say that a defendant was volitionally impaired is
generally understood to mean that she could not control her behavior in con-
formity with the law. Usually, the desired legal consequence of this verbal
association is mitigation, which is warranted because culpability should not
be ascribed when an agent has acted involuntarily. However, cases involv-
ing real involuntary action actually represent a small number of circum-
stances. Defendants like McBroom, whose conduct, upon close examina-
tion, can be shown to be completely voluntary, actually strive to "borrow
excusing force"59 from that limited class of cases.
There are several conceptual problems with this line of reasoning. The
most obvious is simply that defendants such as McBroom are able to appre-
ciate fully, before they act, the legal and moral consequences of their ac-
tions. Further, such defendants are under no readily apparent compulsion
when they decide to act. Thus, their conduct reasonably appears to be com-
57 See infra Part IV.A (discussing these practical problems).
59 See supra note 35 and accompanying text (listing deterrence, incapacitation, just pun-
ishment, and rehabilitation as Congress's sentencing objectives).
59 Morse, supra note 27, at 1591.
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pletely voluntary to the casual observer. Nevertheless, volitional impair-
ment continues to be asserted under four major theories, each of which pur-
ports to establish that the defendant was, in fact, out-of-control: (1) Deter-
minism or Universal Causation, (2) Defect of the Will, (3) Irresistible
Impulse, and (4) Hard Choice. Ultimately, each of these theories fails to
prove that so-called "volitionally impaired" defendants lack self-control in
any meaningful way for sentencing purposes.
A. A Paradigm for Voluntary and Involuntary Action
The following Subparts of this Comment refer to cases of true, or un-
controversial, involuntary action, as opposed to voluntary action that is col-
loquially couched as involuntary by the label "volitional impairment."
60
Developing an understanding of the key differences between voluntary and
involuntary action is important because if volitionally impaired defendants
are not out-of-control in any literal sense, then a theory for mitigating pun-
ishment for action, rather than for the absence of action, is necessary to jus-
tify reductions in sentences in these cases.
Professor Morse offers the following illustration, which is quite helpful
in appreciating the distinction between voluntary and involuntary action in
cases like McBroom:
Suppose you are sitting on a table with your legs dangling over the edge. As-
sume that you are neurologically intact and that you strongly prefer not to raise
your legs.... [There] are [several] possible ways in which your.., leg might
nevertheless move... : (1) Someone strikes your knee in the appropriate
place, producing the patellar reflex, and your leg jerks upwards; (2) Someone
vastly stronger than you pulls your leg up, despite your valiant resistance ef-
forts; (3) Someone threatens to kill you unless you raise your leg;... [(4)] An
impulse to raise your leg arises and, without thinking, you raise your leg; [(5)]
You simply can not understand other-regarding reasons for not doing what you
want to do when you want to do it, and you now want to raise your leg, so you
do; [(6)]... [S]omeone offers you something you want even more than not to
raise your leg if only you raise it, 
so you do.ym
According to Professor Morse, "The first two cases are uncontrover-
sially cases in which action is lacking: in case one an irresistible neurologi-
cal mechanism is at work, and in case two an irresistible external force is
60 See id. at 1590-92 (arguing that there is a "lure of mechanism and metaphor," by which
most people wrongly assimilate cases of uncontroversial involuntariness (for example, mus-
cular reflexes, or where an external force physically compels movement) with instances where
there is no literal involuntariness).
61 Id. at 1590-91.
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literally physically compelling the movement of your body." 62 However, in
each of the other cases, he posits that there is "intentional, physically vol-
untary action. ,
63
This may be surprising. Indeed, cases three through six are, to varying
degrees, often considered involuntary in common speech: 64 case three de-
scribes a typical duress scenario; case four represents a response to a spon-
taneous impulse; case five depicts an irrational actor; and case six describes
a classic hard choice. But note that none of these cases portray instances of
true involuntary action-there is no physical reflexive mechanism or exter-
nal compulsion at work. With the exception of case five, where one lacks
the cognitive ability to appreciate one's own actions, each case involves a
rational decision to act voluntarily.
This is the paradigm for voluntary action applied throughout this Com-
ment. In some cases of literal voluntary action, mitigation will be warranted
on moral grounds, such as in case five involving the irrational actor. How-
ever, in general, criminal law does not excuse or mitigate for intentional and
voluntary physical action.65 Because the majority of cases where volitional
impairment will be claimed actually represent voluntary action, any theory
that purports to mitigate punishment must survive close scrutiny.
B. Deconstructing the Major Underlying Theories of Volitional Impairment
1. Determinism or the Universal Causation Theory
The fundamental premise of the theory of determinism, also called uni-
versal causation, is that "all human action should (or should not) be morally
excused because all acts are nonculpably 'out-of-control' [in some
sense]."
66
Determinism represents a "fundamental psycholegal error" 67 that is
made by many under certain circumstances where voluntariness is not im-
mediately apparent. It advocates complete exculpation in every single case
of alleged involuntariness, or else in none. Such a proposition creates a
dangerous presumption that actors are not ultimately accountable for their
62 Id. at 1591.
63 Id.
64 See id. ("In all of [the cases], it is undeniably colloquial speech to claim, with varying
degrees of success, that one cannot help oneself, that one's act was 'involuntary' ... ).
65 See KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 18, at 171-81 (discussing culpable conduct
and the voluntary act requirement).
66 Id. at 1592; see also MICHAEL S. MOORE, AcT AND CRIvm 156-58 (1993) (discussing
the determinist position).
67 Morse, supra note 27, at 1592.
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conduct. In cases like McBroom, describing the defendant's actions as in-
voluntary based on such a theory seems counter-intuitive and wholly unsat-
isfying. Consequently, determinism has been widely refuted by legal phi-
losophers because
[m]ost human movement is not literally compelled and most acts are not done
under unusual constraints that might justify an excuse, such as to avoid threats
of death or serious bodily harm or in response to hallucinations. Moreover, if
determinism or universal causation were (or were not) true and the basis for an
excuse, then everyone would (or would not be) excused for all action, an out-
come inconsistent with the arguments for a discrete control excuse.68
Because determinism essentially reasons that all human action should
be excused completely (or, in the alternative, that no action should be ex-
cused), it has not been accepted with respect to any affirmative defenses.
69
To the extent that determinism supports mitigation for out-of-control con-
duct, it must be rejected for purposes of sentencing as well. The basic ar-
guments used to defeat determinism as a complete defense are entirely ap-
plicable in the sentencing context.
First, defendants must be held fully accountable for their own, uncom-
pelled behavior, and only for such behavior. Otherwise, holding people re-
sponsible for actions that are externally caused is like leaving the agent out
of a story "that talks of [one's own] volitional states as causing those
movements." 70 We would all be observers, that is, of our own lives, without
any accountability for the consequences of our actions. Second, even if de-
terminism were true, punishment and sentencing would still be required in
order to ensure just desserts. Even in a determinist universe, injured parties
seek retribution for harms they suffer. Thus, determinism or universal cau-
sation "does not [require] lack of control in the relevant sense" to support
mitigation in cases of alleged volitional impairment.71 Reliance on deter-
minism would "require a complete restructuring of our sense of ourselves as
responsible agents, our moral practices more generally, and, not least, our
system of criminal justice."
72
68 Id.
69 See id. at 1594 ("Determinism or universal causation does not provide a discrete basis
for justifying control excuses."). Indeed, the concept of complete exculpation resulting from
the notion that all actions are predetermined is contrary to the very essence of punishment.
70 MOORE, supra note 66, at 158.




2. Defect of the Will Theory
One of the most standard assertions by defendants who allege a lack of
self-control is that they suffer some defect of the will. That is, they claim
that they lacked a free and operative will at the time of their conduct.
The notion that there is something like volition, or will, inside human
beings is perhaps best understood by recalling one's intuitive sense "that
'something' is indeed 'left over' if we subtract the fact that our arm rises
from the fact that we raised our arm." 73 As human beings we have a first-
person awareness of control that we do not have when we are acted upon by
forces beyond our control. Thus, there is little dispute that volition some-
how exists within the human psyche. Moreover, if an act is voluntary, it
must be a product of one's volition. As Alvin Goldman notes: "The primary
aim of the theory [of volitions] is to distinguish voluntary from non-
voluntary events. ' 4
Unfortunately, especially for those asserting a defect of the will as the
justification for asserted out-of-control conduct, there is little scientific evi-
dence as to how volition operates. Consequently, the exploration of this
topic has largely been left to philosophers as a metaphysical question.
75
Philosophers have contributed to a more sophisticated understanding of vo-
lition by clarifying three key questions: What actions are willed? What is
the content of "willing"? How does "willing" cause subsequent action?
a. What Actions Are Willed?
Justice Holmes took the least complex view regarding willed acts and
their scope. To Holmes, "[a]n act is always a voluntary muscular contrac-
tion, and nothing else. The chain of physical sequences which an act sets in
motion or directs to the plaintiffs harm is no part of it."
76
73 MOORE, supra note 66, at 134 (paraphrasing LUDWIG WrrrGENSTEIN,
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 621 (3d ed. London 1958)).
74 Alvin I. Goldman, The Volitional Theory Revisited, in ACTION THEORY 67-68 (Myles
Brand & Douglas Watson eds., 1975).
75 Professor Morse has remarked: "The will and free will are not legal criteria, and
agents in the criminal justice system would do well to dispense with employing them in re-
sponsibility analysis and attribution." Morse, supra note 27, at 1599.
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 91 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co.
1946) (1881). In making this observation, that acts involve only "basic actions," Holmes was
actually building on the work of Professor Austin, who had earlier explained:
Most of the names which seem to be names of acts, are names of acts coupled with
certain of their consequences. For example: If I kill you with a gun or pistol, I shoot
you. And the long train of incidents which are denoted by that brief expression, are
considered (or spoken of) as if they constituted an act, perpetrated by me. In truth,
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Contrary to this formulation is the notion that willed acts are not limited
to basic actions, but instead encompass a series of circumstances and conse-
quences.77 The logical force of this opposing view stems from the observa-
tion that in "common speech," an "act" involves more than a simplistic con-
cept of mere muscular contractions. Rather, it extends to the consequences
of basic actions as well.78 Under this view, it is possible to will yourself
"[to] chang[e] a spark plug," for example. 79 The idea is that this complex
act involves willing because, after all, most people do not think in terms of
the numerous muscular contractions that are actually involved in changing a
spark plug.
This broad understanding of what can be willed, however, has been
soundly rejected as too imprecise. 80 The problem, simply put, is that once
circumstances and consequences are included in the same act that is willed,
all logical bounds seem to disappear. As one critic has written: "The bodily
motions most concisely described [in common speech] as changing a spark
plug may also be described as making a living."81 Thus, it would be too dif-
ficult to define what is willed with any specificity. Willed voluntary acts
are therefore best understood as simple muscular contractions. Even
though, at most, they may be thought of as a series of muscular contractions,
they remain basic actions in essence.
Recalling the facts of McBroom, the significance of this conclusion be-
comes immediately apparent. McBroom's claim was that he lacked the will
power to prevent himself from possessing child pornography. Possessing
child pornography, however, is not the kind of basic action that can be
willed; it is, instead, a complex action that suggests the consequence of a
series of basic actions. This description of his action is too broad to be
willed.
the only parts of the train which are my act or acts, are the muscular motions by
which I raise the weapon, point it at your head or body and pull the trigger.
I JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 290 (Robert Campbell ed., Jersey City, Fre-
derick D. Linn & Co. 1875).
77 See Kevin W. Saunders, Voluntary Acts and the Criminal Law: Justifying Culpability
Based on the Existence of Volition, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 443, 449 (1988) (discussing the ques-
tion of "whether the act-voluntary act distinction is a meaningful one, that is, whether there
reall% is a mental element").
8 See id. at 450 (discussing the Austin-Holmes theory of muscular contraction and op-
posing viewpoints). But see AUSTIN, supra note 76, at 290 (refuting the view that an "act"
extends to the consequences of "basic actions").
79 Saunders, supra note 76, at 451.
80 See id. at 451 (stating that "the conclusion that an act must include more than bodily




A better approach in this case, then, is to focus on the basic actions as-
sociated with possessing child pornography. These generally include sitting
down in front of the computer, typing on the computer's keyboard, and the
individual muscular contractions involved in selecting the pornography
from the Internet. These are the kinds of actions that might be subject to a
defect of the will, and, obviously, they were performed flawlessly in
McBroom's case. McBroom's command over his basic actions was entirely
voluntary, reflecting a perfectly functioning will.
b. What Is the Content of "Willing"?
Professor Austin conceived of willing as a kind of desire or wish; to
will something was to desire that it happen.82  Other philosophers have
83similarly argued that people act out of beliefs, desires, or intentions.
Viewed this way, however, the will posed a great mystery. The trouble
was that some "operator" was necessary to go from desires, beliefs, and
wishes to a bodily movement that successfully satisfied our desires.8 4 Aus-
tin attempted to solve this problem by positing a "mental-cause" thesis,
whereby action was associated with the will inasmuch as the will was an
"action initiator."8 5 Yet, skeptics remained unsatisfied.86
Recently, Professor Moore has argued persuasively that the will is best
conceived of as a "bare intention. ''s  Moore rejects the idea that the will
consists of "wants," that is, desires, beliefs, or wishes, because the best rea-
son to believe a human will exists is in the "executory role" that it plays.
8 8
According to Moore, wanting or wishing to do something is too compatible
82 See AUSTIN, supra note 76, at 287 ("The desire is commonly called an act of the will;
or is supposed to be an effect of a power or faculty of willing, supposed to reside in man.").
83 See MOORE, supra note 66, at 117-21 (discussing the approaches of other philoso-
phe1T?'See Morse, supra note 27, at 1595 (stating that the theory of volition seeks to solve the
mystery of how intentions and desires lead to voluntary acts).
85 See MOORE, supra note 66, at 113-15 (discussing Austin's thesis on action and voli-
tion).
86 It was the inability to explain away this mystery that led Professor Hart to conclude
that the law essentially ignores the voluntary act requirement and to dismiss the debate over
volition entirely. Hart wrote of his struggle to "find in any legal writings any clear or credible
account of what it is for conduct to be voluntary ... in the sense required." H.L.A. Hart, Acts
of Will and Responsibility, in THE JUBILEE LECTURES OF THE FACULTY OF LAW, UNIVERSITY
OF SHEFFIELD 115, 115-16 (0. Marshall ed., 1960). Hart further claimed that "[volition and
the voluntary act] doctrine has only rarely been considered by the courts" and that he was "not
convinced that the courts actually do accept [the] general doctrine." H.L.A. Hart, Acts of Will
and Responsibility, in FREEDOM AND THE WILL 38, 41 (D. Pears ed., 1963).
87 MOORE, supra note 66, at 120-21. "A bare intention is an intention to do a future
act"e-hat is, not an immediate intention. Id. at 119.
88 Id.
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with not having to do anything to be descriptive of the human will. Thus,
he prefers to think of volition as a species of intention:
[Bare intentions] execute our background motivational [e.g., desires] and cog-
nitive [e.g., beliefs] states into actions, ... even when our desires or beliefs are
in conflict, [and] account for our failures to execute such beliefs or desires ....
Volitions are simply the last executors both of our more general intentions and
of the background states of desire and belief that those more general intentions
themselves execute.
89
The significance of Moore's philosophical contribution is great. As
long as the content of what is willed was understood to relate to desires or
beliefs, a quasi-mens rea had crept into the voluntary act requirement. In
other words, without the formation of a desire, which is a mental act, the
will was not perceived as able to execute the act. Now that the content of
willing can be thought of as a bare intention, however, there is no longer
any need to focus on a defendant's mental state for the purpose of under-
standing whether or not she had an operative will.
Reviewing the McBroom case in light of Professor Moore's contribu-
tion is illuminating. When considering the will merely as an executory
function, McBroom's wishes, beliefs, and desires are completely irrelevant.
In other words, whether or not McBroom actually wanted to stop himself
from doing what he did is of no importance to the issue of whether his will
was operative. As a result, it is relatively easy to determine that his will
was, in fact, perfectly intact, since he was clearly able to execute the basic
actions, discussed in the preceding Subpart, which arose from his bare in-
tentions.
c. How Does "Willing" Cause Subsequent Action?
There has never been substantial scientific evidence supporting the no-
tion that the brain actually causes the body to move.90 Until recently, the
dearth of scientific evidence was the single most perplexing obstacle to un-
derstanding more fully the operation of the human will.
Professor Moore's "executory role" hypothesis contributes to the reso-
lution of this mystery as well. According to Moore, the will is a "func-
tional" or "executory" state, similar to other mental states which translate
desires, beliefs, and more general intentions into basic actions.91 A func-
89 Id. at 121.
90 See Saunders, supra note 77, at 462-64 (noting that "the mind-body problem may be
philosophical and not subject to scientific analysis").
91 See MOORE, supra note 66, at 130-32 (discussing whether volitions are functional
states, physical states, behavioral states, or mental states); see also Morse, supra note 27, at
1596 (explaining Moore's theory).
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tional mental state is a state whose essential nature is specified by the func-
tional roles it plays in causing, and being caused by, other states and
events. 92 The word "pain," for example, names a functional state specified
by its role in causing certain behavior, by certain stimuli causing it, and by
its relationships with other mental states, such as beliefs and intentions. The
will, in Moore's view, involves an executory state along these same lines:
"[V]olitions are specified by the role they play in proximately causing bod-
ily motions and in being the effects of both our more general intentions and
the belief-desire sets the latter execute."
93
Moore's theory advances our understanding of out-of-control claims
based on defects of the will in various ways. In particular, it is now difficult
to conceive of a defective will that would render a defendant helplessly
lacking in self-control, 94 even in a highly coercive scenario. Recall, for ex-
ample, case three from the illustration in Part III.A,95 where an individual is
placed under extreme duress to act as instructed. Although she is literally
compelled to move despite her strong desire not to act under such circum-
stances, there is no literal defect in her will. Rather, action results because
she finds it more difficult to resist the external pressure being imposed than
to surrender to the oppressor.
Moreover, one's desires or wishes to remain still have nothing to do
with the effectiveness of one's will in such a scenario. 96 It is apparent that
even under such coercive conditions, an individual is able to execute the
bare intentions associated with the acts demanded by the oppressor. Even
under such pressure, an individual does have a choice to make, and her will
is able to execute her decision.
This analysis led Professor Morse to conclude that "the meanings of
'cannot help myself and 'involuntariness' are not literal, and the alluring
metaphor of mechanism [such as a muscular reflex or physical compulsion]
92 See MoORE, supra note 66, at 130 (discussing the role that mental states play in under-
standing the concept of volition).
93 Id. at 131.
94 Professor Morse points out that, theoretically, there may be one exception to the con-
clusion that out-of-control agents have intact wills. This would be the case, for example,
where there is a duty to act, and the agent wants to fulfill his duty, but is psychologically
paralyzed, perhaps due to some phobia. See Morse, supra note 27, at 1596-98 (positing, as an
example, a parent with agoraphobia unable to rush outside to help his child who is suffering
from a seizure). Morse, however, notes that he has never encountered a judicial opinion in-
volving such a case. See id. at 1597.
95 See supra text accompanying note 61 and accompanying text (noting the example
where "[s]omeone threatens to kill you unless you raise your leg").
96 See infra notes 98-121 and accompanying text (rejecting theories, such as the Irresisti-
ble Impulse Theory and the Hard Choice Theory, which are often employed to explain the
reasons for a claimed absence of volition).
1999]
750 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
should not obscure the difference." 97 In other words, in virtually all cases
where volitional impairment is claimed, the defective will theories fail, and,
therefore, a defendant's will may be considered perfectly operative. Conse-
quently, if mitigation in sentencing is sought, it should be based on some-
thing other than the notion that the defendant lacked free will.
3. Irresistible Impulse Theory
Defendants who allege they were out-of-control also commonly claim
that they had an "irresistible impulse." They argue that they simply could
not resist their urges; no matter how hard they tried, they were overcome by
their desires to give in.
Impulse control disorders such as kleptomania, pyromania, and patho-
logical gambling are all established categories of mental conditions.98 Al-
though not medically identical in nature, compulsive disorders are thought
to have a potential for motivational forces similar to impulsive disorders.
99
However, the fact that such conditions possess a medical diagnosis does
not necessarily imply that the actions resulting from impulse disorders are
any less voluntary than are "normal" actions. As Professor Morse explains,
[h]uman beings incontrovertibly can be subject to momentary and apparently
capricious passions that leave them feeling subjectively unfree and that seem
to compromise their ability to control themselves.... [W]hy is [the clinical
case of irresistible impulse] different from standard cases of people desiring to
fulfill momentary, strong desires?... After all, why should a powerful de-
sire-really, really wanting something-be assimilated to the patellar re-
flex?
° °
There simply is no reliable metric with which to determine the magni-
tude of impulses that would lend credibility to a theory of irresistible im-
pulse.101 Moreover, the defendant with an irresistible impulse disorder may
97 Morse, supra note 27, at 1591 (footnote omitted).
98 See id. at 1599 & n.39 (citing the American Psychiatric Association Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, and noting that these disorders may result in behavior
for which "the agent will seek an excuse").
99 See id. at 1600 ("Both impulses and compulsions are often thought to have the poten-
tial for coercive motivational force." (citing GEORGE AINSLIE, PICOECONOMICS: THE
STRATEGIC INTERACTION OF SUCCESSIVE MOTIVATIONAL STATES WITHIN THE PERSON 205
(1992))).
1 Morse, supra note 27, at 1600. The patellar reflex, of course, is represented by case
one, discussed previously. See supra note 61 and accompanying text ("Someone strikes your
knee in the appropriate place, producing the patellar reflex, and your leg jerks upwards.").
101 See Morse, supra note 27, at 1657 (noting that even if trained observers could agree
that a person exhibits certain impulses, or, by contrast, lacks them, that alone would not nec-
essarily validate that form of observation as a reliable test).
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have even less ground for having her punishment mitigated than would the
ordinary, habitually impulsive person. This is because the clinically impul-
sive defendant "knows that she is especially likely to act thoughtlessly, and
may therefore be held accountable for failure to take steps that might rem-
edy habitual impulsiveness or avoid those situations that might facilitate
it.,,102
Understood this way, affording special treatment to defendants based on
irresistible impulse diagnoses allows them to benefit from a character trait
that makes correct behavior more difficult for, though obtainable by, them.
Professor Morse takes issue with mitigation due to an irresistible impulse
along these same lines:
Character rarely furnishes the basis for a legal excuse .... The law assumes
that people who are characterologically thoughtless, careless, pugnacious, ex-
citable, cowardly, cruel and the like can be expected to control themselves and
should be held accountable if they violate the law. True, it may be harder for
such people to behave, but the law assumes that they do not lack the ability to
do so.10
4. The Hard Choice Theory
The most sophisticated theory regularly employed by defendants
claiming a lack of self-control posits that control over one's conduct resides
in the ability to choose. Recall, for example, case six from the illustration in
Part III.A.' °4
The basic claim involves two parts. First, the mental abnormality is
presumed to coerce the defendant internally to act wrongfully. Second, the
defendant is portrayed as facing an excruciatingly hard choice. 10 5 Essen-
tially, the hard choice theory states that: "[Y]ou want to do something that
you know you should not do, but you feel like you must do it anyhow be-
cause the pain of not doing it will be unbearable."
10 6
102 Id. at 1601.
103 Id. at 1602. Professor Morse acknowledges that it is sometimes hard to conform
one's behavior, but he also thinks that it can be difficult for everyone at varying moments in
one's life. In an effort to explain why it is difficult for humans to keep "flying straight," as he
puts it, Morse suggests a list of several "self-control strategies" that are helpful to anyone who
is struggling to remain in control. His list is not intended to be exhaustive, and includes the
following: self-consciousness (the ability to monitor oneself), fear of consequences, moderate
temp erament, and the capacity for empathy or identification with others. See id. at 1605-10.
104 See supra text accompanying note 61 ("Someone offers you something you want even
more than not to raise your leg if only you raise it, so you do.").
105 See Morse, supra note 27, at 1611-34 (discussing lack of control as "hard choice").
106 Id. at 1619. Professor Morse notes that the intended analogy in hard choice cases is to
situations of external duress. The idea is that the internal pain acts like an external force de-
serving of special consideration. Morse rejects the analogy in most cases, arguing that any
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In hard choice cases, the defendant experiences intense and unpleasant
emotions that can only be alleviated through wrongful action. As Professor
Morse explains: "Although some... 'positive' experience of 'release' will
accompany the wrongdoing, the primary motivation is the avoidance of
dysphoria."'10 7 It was this scenario that ultimately convinced the Third Cir-
cuit in McBroom that the defendant's actions deserved reduced punishment.
The court reasoned, for example, that McBroom's condition was "a phe-
nomenon which is not about erotic gratification, but about an attempt to
control the overwhelming mental pain and tension that may accompany an
unfulfilled compulsion."'10 8 This model seems to support a common sense
notion of uncontrollable behavior. Yet, upon closer scrutiny, it too fails to
persuade that the individual is literally out-of-control.
Hard choice scenarios are more difficult to analyze because, as the term
suggests, the defendant in fact faces an unusually difficult decision. The
problem, however, is that "those wishing to draw an analogy to examples of
no literal choice" equate a hard choice with no choice. 0 9 Indeed, hard
choice situations do not involve classic uncontroversial involuntariness, be-
cause they are not physical compulsions or reflexive responses. In addition,
defendants in hard choice scenarios act intentionally and exercise free
choice when they decide to avoid dysphoria by acting wrongfully. Further-
more, in choosing to avoid dysphoria, defendants make perfectly sensible
choices.
110
Recalling the facts in McBroom highlights the complex dynamics of
hard choice scenarios. McBroom contended that his actions were in re-
sponse to a painful compulsion. Yet, objectively speaking, he was never
physically forced to sit at his computer and download contraband material;
nor was his conduct a response to any muscular reflex. In fact, rather than
resisting his intense craving, McBroom knowingly elected to succumb to a
legally and morally reproachable option. Although this may have been per-
fectly rational under the circumstances, the key concept to grasp is that his
resulting action was the product of his own free and voluntary decision-
mitigating effect must be based on some criteria other than involuntariness. See id. at 1611-
34.
107 Id. at 1619-20. The lay definition of dysphoria is "a generalized state of feeling un-
well or unhappy." WEBSTER'S THiRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 712 (1981).
108 United States v. McBroom, 124 F.3d 533, 541-42 (3d Cir. 1997); see also id. at 540
(accepting testimony that "if the phrase 'significantly reduced mental state' is intended to in-
clude a reduced capacity for choice ... then Mr. McBroom's condition ... fulfills that defmi-
ton").
109 Morse, supra note 27, at 1604.
11o See id. at 1622-24 (discussing the mental processes in which internally coerced agents
engage in order to avoid dysphoria).
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making. His choice may have been hard, but he did have one. Conse-
quently, he should be held accountable for it.
This literalist proposition is typically countered by one facet of hard
choice scenarios that has not been mentioned. Namely, some argue that
even if, technically speaking, a rational choice has been made, the quality of
the choice is not meaningful. In other words, in the defendant's mind, at
least, there is no real choice."' Indeed, some hard choice scenarios will
warrant reduced punishment because as a society we deem the quality of the
choice faced to be simply too hard.' 12 But it is important to emphasize that
in such cases we are not mitigating under the assumption that the defendant
has had no choice. Furthermore, such situations in which we are asked to
mitigate out of mercy for the difficulty of the choice confronted by the de-
fendant raises serious problems of line-drawing. 
13
Whether or not a defendant is deemed to have had a choice is important
for two key reasons. First, if a defendant's motive for satisfying a desire is
not the avoidance of dysphoria, but purely for pleasure, then there is no
compulsion to worry about, no matter how strong the desire. 114 However, to
automatically assume that there was no choice in these cases would mitigate
punishment unnecessarily. Second, even if a defendant was motivated by
the desire to avoid pain, if the goal of the compulsive behavior is senseless,
such as when a kleptomaniac steals a car for no reason at all, then craving
for it may collapse into a rationality problem. l s As will be discussed in
Part IV.B, irrationality offers useful alternative grounds for mitigation be-
cause it avoids the misperceptions surrounding out-of-control theories.
Note that defendants in hard choice scenarios cannot credibly point to
any defect of the will. The human will, now properly understood,'1 6 is an
executory mental state whose role is simply to translate bare intentions into
basic actions; it does not interfere with voluntariness in any way. Moreover,
even if a defendant were irrational, the executory function of the will would
III See id. at 1614 (discussing a basic working model for such coercion excuses, i.e.
"[e]ven though the person has a choice among actions-that is, no superior force is physically
moving her body-there is no 'real' or 'acceptable' alternative").
See infra notes 144-55 and accompanying text (discussing judges' departures from the
sentencing guidelines based on section 5K2.13, and in light of varying concerns about the de-
fendants' plights).
113 Deciding the point at which a hard choice becomes too difficult and deserves mercy is
a highly subjective endeavor.
114 See Morse, supra note 27, at 1624 (noting that "seeking pleasure is surely a rational
reason to form an intention").
115 See id. at 1624 ("If a person's ultimate goal ... is properly characterized as irrational,
cravin for it collapses into a rationality problem .....
See supra Part II.B.2 (deconstructing the theory of a defect of the will).
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still perform effectively, producing action that satisfies her intense, though
irrational, bare intentions.
117
Nor can defendants facing a hard choice scenario argue that their pun-
ishment should be mitigated under a determinist view of the world,"' or in
light of the irresistibility of their impulses. 119 Just as there is no reliable
evidence that "abnormal" desires are necessarily stronger than are "normal"
desires, there is no reason to believe that the hard choices these desires pres-
ent are any more difficult for some than for others.
120
Taken together, these points combine to refute the notion that hard
choices represent no choices and, by implication, that a defendant acts in-
voluntarily under such circumstances. In fact, in such scenarios the defen-
dant does have self-control, and makes a free (though admittedly difficult)
choice. But, as Professor Morse has aptly concluded,
[t]here is good reason to believe... [that in most hard choice cases] the choice
is probably not so hard that one could not fly straight rather than commit seri-
ous crimes.... [Mitigating punishment] in such cases would be a morally
perverse result based on a behavior assessment technology that we lack.
121
5. Summary
The main conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing discussion is that
the label "volitional impairment" is misleading. The goal of defendants
who invoke it is to draw upon a metaphorical connection to select cases of
uncontroversial involuntariness, such as muscular reflexes and instances of
external physical compulsion. This practice is alarmingly successful: many
voluntary acts often appear to be involuntary to the casual observer. Exam-
ples include action compelled under duress, so-called irresistible impulses,
hard choices, and cases involving irrational behavior. However, once the
underlying theories that attempt to link such situations with involuntariness
are deconstructed and scrutinized, it becomes clear that volitional impair-
ment should not be associated with a lack of self-control in a literal sense
for any of these cases.
117 See Morse, supra note 27, at 1625 ("[T]here is no defect in the will or volition, even if
a person has intense, irrational desires that cause great dysphoria.").
118 See supra Part III.B.1 (explaining that for the determinist view to be logically consis-
tent, no humans should ever be held to be culpable).
119 See supra Part III.B.3 (deconstructing the irresistible impulse theory, which is often
asserted by defendants who claim that they cannot resist their urges).
120 See supra note 101 and accompanying text (arguing that there is no reliable way to
measure irresistible impulses).
121 Morse, supra note 27, at 1633-34 (footnote omitted).
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Each of the major theories underpinning claims about the effects of vo-
litional impairment on a defendant's mental capacity and on her ability to
engage in actions voluntarily prove unsatisfactory. The proposition that
human beings are subject to determinism or universal causation, whereby all
actions are predetermined, is easily refutable. The concept of a defective
human will is nonsensical once the will is understood to represent an ex-
ecutory mental state. There is simply no evidence to support the notion that
abnormal impulses are more irresistible than normal ones just because a de-
fendant has been diagnosed with an impulse disorder. Finally, the notion of
hard choice should not be analogized to situations involving no choice.
Thus, as a general matter, so-called "out-of-control" defendants seem able
to choose between alternatives, to exercise free will, and to act voluntarily.
IV. VOLITIONAL IMPAIRMENT AND SENTENCING IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
With the meaning of volitional impairment clarified, it remains to be
established precisely why this concept should not serve as a basis for re-
duced mental capacity departures under Guidelines section 5K2.13. There
are three main arguments against its use. The first is an extension of the
principles already set forth in Part III: sentencing departures are not war-
ranted for most defendants who claim to be out-of-control, because in the
vast majority of cases their condition does not imply a literal lack of self-
control, making them morally responsible for their actions.122 Second, it is
appropriate and necessary to refuse to mitigate punishment in such cases in
order to ensure that Congress's primary objectives in enacting the Guide-
lines are satisfied. Third, given the widespread misperceptions regarding
the meaning of volitional impairment, section 5K2.13 can become a danger-
ous tool in the hands of sentencing courts, potentially subject to abuse.
In light of these practical concerns about implementing a standard that
allows for departures based on volitional impairment, a better approach re-
lies on more traditional and well-established grounds for asserting reduced
mental capacity, namely, cognitive impairment.1 23 As Professor Morse has
122 Note that in cases involving true involuntary action (for example, muscular reflexes
and physical compulsion), the law provides the defendant a complete defense because the vol-
untary act element of the crime is not satisfied. See KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 18,
at 175-78, 994-98 (discussing involuntary action generally). Similarly, the defendant who is
able to establish irrationality is also completely excused by virtue of an insanity defense. See
id. at 929-32 (discussing the insanity defense generally). Such defendants have no need for
sentencing departures.
123 Recall the gist of the M'Naghten test for cognitive ability: whether the defendant did
not know the "nature and quality of the act he was doing; or if he did know it, that he did not
know he was doing what was wrong." Daniel M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (H.L.
1843); see also supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
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concluded, "[m]any of the cases we mistakenly or loosely term 'volitional'
or involuntary" are actually problems of rationality.
124
Unfortunately the Commission has adopted McBroom wholesale, ap-
parently oblivious to the inherent deficiencies of such a decision. Once
again, it seems it will be up to Congress to address volitional impairment
and to avoid its potentially deleterious consequences in the sentencing con-
text. 125
A. Rejecting Volitional Impairment as Grounds for
Section 5K2.13 Departures
1. Voluntary Actions and Moral Responsibility
It has been argued up to this point that, despite widespread mispercep-
tions to the contrary, volitionally impaired defendants do not literally act in-
voluntarily. Even this proposition is understood and accepted, some may
still feel the need to either excuse or mitigate punishment for allegedly out-
of-control defendants on moral grounds. Their concern is that even if the
action was voluntary, the impulse was simply too strong, or the choice too
difficult, to morally justify unmitigated punishment.
Until recently, classic theories of moral responsibility relied primarily
on the concepts of voluntariness1 26 and choice 127 for ascribing moral blame.
These theories may, in fact, support mitigation for an allegedly volitionally
impaired defendant like McBroom even though his actions are properly un-
derstood as voluntary. This is because an argument could be made that the
choice he faced was not meaningful, or his impulse too strong, or any other
explanation that might justify involuntariness. However, these theories of
moral responsibility have largely been discredited in recent years because
124 Morse, supra note 27, at 1624.
125 Recall that Congress ultimately resisted any role for volitional impairment during the
guilt phase of federal trials, thereby deciding an issue that had previously been unsettled.
See supra Part I. The new amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines are valid as proposed by
the Sentencing Commission unless modified or rejected by Congress. See U.S.
Sentencing Commission, Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines (May 18,
1998), available in U.S. Sentencing Commission Homepage (visited Feb. 17, 1999)
<http://www.ussc.gov/pdf/98amend2.htm> (noting on its coverpage that the official text of the
amendments were submitted to Congress for review and ratification).
126 See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book III, in THE SPECTRUM OF RESPONSIBILITY
24-33 (Peter A. French ed. & David Ross trans., 1991) (representing the classic view of re-
sponsibility that people are accountable for their voluntary acts).
127 See Harry G. Frankfurt, Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility, in THE
SPECTRUM OF RESPONSIBILriY, supra note 126, at 102-11 (arguing that an agent is morally
responsible for what she has done only if she could have done otherwise).
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they are an incomplete guide to understanding moral blameworthiness.
128
An alternative theory is required, then, if we are to appreciate the relation-
ship between moral blameworthiness and punishment in cases such as
McBroom.
Professor R. Jay Wallace has provided such a theory.129 He argues that
"[b]eing a responsible moral agent.., is not really a matter of [voluntari-
ness or] freedom of the will. Rather, it primarily involves a form of norma-
tive competence: the ability to grasp and apply moral reasons, and to gov-
ern one's behavior by the light of such reasons."'130 The "moral reasons"
Wallace refers to are the reactive emotions--"resentment, indignation, and
guilt."'131 His conception of moral responsibility is important because it im-
plies that most defendants who are able to reason and reflect upon what they
do are responsible for their actions. In essence, the lack of having any abil-
ity to perform self-reflection, not the involuntariness of one's actions, is
what excuses an agent from moral blame.
132
Professor Wallace makes several key observations that help to explain
the proper role of sentencing in terms of moral responsibility. First, to hold
a defendant morally responsible is nothing more than to hold her to certain
expectations which society has set for itself and accepted. The question,
thus, is a normative one-that is from the standpoint of the moral judge, not
the judged. 133 In other words, it is generally not important what the defen-
dant thought or felt about the morally reprehensible conduct; the critical is-
sue is how society feels about it.
129 The main problem with relying on voluntary actions, of course, is that voluntariness is
to a large extent a metaphysical question. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (noting
that the lack of scientific evidence on the operation of volition means that the topic is a meta-
physical question for philosophers to discuss). Many cases in which action is deemed invol-
untary actually involve a judgment call by the court. See Frankfurt, supra note 127, at 108.
As Harry Frankfiut notes, "We often do ... excuse people for what they have done when they
tell us (and we believe them) that they could not have done otherwise. But this is because we
assume that what they tell us serves to explain why they did what they did." Id. at 110.
129 See R. JAY WALLACE, RESPONSEBILrrY AND THE MORAL SENTIMENTs 1 (1994)
("This is a book about moral responsibility. In the most basic terms, it sets out to provide an




132 See id. at 183 ("[W]hat matters is not the ability to exercise ... reflective self control,
but simply the possession of such powers ... ).
1 See id. at 5 (I propose that we interpret the debate about moral responsibility in nor-
mative terms.... [W]e cannot establish what it is to be a morally responsible agent unless we
first understand the stance of holding someone responsible-the stance of the moral judge,
rather than of the agent who is judged."); see also id. at 62-74 (discussing responsibility and
the reactive emotions, generally).
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Second, although the practice of holding defendants responsible may be
consistent with retributivist notions of justice, it is incorrect to assume that
this is necessarily wedded to moral responsibility in any pejorative sense.
Holding people responsible need not be linked to attitudes of vengeance or
cruelty. Rather, the emotions expressed by sanctioning are "focused emo-
tional responses to the violation of moral obligations that we [as a society]
accept."' 134 To hold a defendant responsible is not to condemn her for who
she is, it is only to punish her for what she did, in order to ensure that the
moral values of society in general are protected.
Finally, and most importantly, the fact that a defendant may face a hard
choice makes little difference to Wallace's view of moral responsibility, as
long as the defendant's ability to reflect is present. The ability to reason, or
cognitive ability, is the key. Impulses, for example, no matter how strong,
are thought to have no impact on the defendant's ability to reason effec-
tively about what she does. 135 Regardless of the quality of the choice,
Wallace concludes that as long as the defendant is left with the ability to
turn choice into action, then even if it would take "Odysseus-like" efforts to
resist the impulse, "it would seem reasonable to treat h[er] as morally ac-
countable."
136
Therefore, where a defendant is aware of her actions and can appreciate
the implications of her behavior, it is both appropriate and necessary to as-
cribe full, unmitigated moral and legal responsibility to her. The failure to
do so is the equivalent of cheating society by not enforcing the agreed upon
moral standards uniformly. Absent any rationality defects in the defendant,
reducing punishment based on volitional impairment amounts to nothing
more than mitigating sentences for knowing and voluntary behavior. This is
not only unfair to those convicted of the same offense, and to those who will
not stand to benefit from section 5K2.13, but it is also morally irresponsible.
2. The Federal Sentencing Objectives
Mitigation is appropriate when special circumstances or limitations are
insufficient to justify or excuse conduct, but do indicate that the defendant
encountered unusual difficulty in conforming to the requirements of the
law. 137 The Guidelines adopt this general principle, and section 5K2.13
134 Id. at 69.
135 See id. at 170-80 (positing various situations where an individual may, or may not be,
morally accountable depending on the capacity to engage in "reflective self-control").
13Id. at 173-74.
137 See generally C.T. SIsTARE, REsPoNsiBILrry AND CRIMNAL LIABEIlTY 32 (1989)
("The agent who makes a successful claim of excuse[,] ... justification, or mitigation is ex-
empted from the normal course of legal response.").
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specifically was designed to provide leniency in sentencing for federal of-
fenders who suffer from reduced mental capacities. 13 However, in order to
assess whether considering volitional impairment as an alternative standard
for reduced mental capacity is proper, we must reflect carefully upon Con-
gress's primary objectives in promulgating the SRA.
Recall that Congress intended for its new sentencing structure to ad-
dress all of the basic purposes of criminal punishment: deterrence, inca-
pacitation, just punishment, and rehabilitation. 139 Additionally, an over-
arching goal of Congress's reform efforts was to reduce nationwide
disparities in sentencing.
140
In light of these considerations, it is clear that even if volitional im-
pairment was equivalent to involuntary action, which it is not, then depar-
tures based on such grounds would fail to advance Congress's objectives.
For example, volitional impairment might point to a lighter sentence under
the principle of just punishment, because the conduct could "not be
helped., 141 But this would simultaneously justify a heavier sentence under
other, equally important principles. In particular, the need for incapacitation
would be arguably much greater for volitionally impaired offenders because
their conduct would be uncontrollable and would pose a serious threat to so-
ciety. These other principles of criminal punishment emphasized by Con-
gress must not be slighted.
142
Moreover, because volitional impairment does not literally represent
involuntary action, allowing it to serve as a basis for departures would se-
verely frustrate the important objective of reducing nationwide disparities in
sentencing. Congress attempted to tackle this problem by mandating a more
structured sentencing regime, whereby similarly situated defendants would
receive similar punishments. 143 But by allowing sentencing courts discre-
tion to depart from the Guidelines based on volitional impairment, a concept
whose true significance is widely misunderstood, judges will undoubtedly
mitigate punishment in cases where the conduct does not deserve leniency.
Two defendants committing the same offense will be subjected to disparate
treatment simply because one has been able to convince the sentencing
138 See supra note 40 and accompanying text (noting that leniency is an appropriate con-
sideration under the Guidelines in certain situations).
139 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
140 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
141 This is how the "lure of mechanism and metaphor" is commonly expressed. See su-
pra note 60 and accompanying text.
142 See United States v. Pullen, 89 F.3d 368, 371 (7th Cir. 1996) (discussing the impor-
tance of considering all of Congress's and the Commission's sentencing objectives).
143 See supra note 36 and accompanying text (indicating that one of Congress's broad
goals was to avoid sentencing disparities).
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judge that her volitional impairment somehow "compelled" her to act, while
the other is unable to substantiate such a claim. This is a scenario remarka-
bly like the indeterminate system that Congress expressly hoped to elimi-
nate through sentencing reform.
Consider how several post-McBroom decisions have struggled with the
notion of volitional impairment in the sentencing context. United States v.
Carucci is a recent case in which the court addressed volitional impairment
pursuant to newly revised section 5K2.13.144 Carucci, formerly a floor bro-
ker on the New York Stock Exchange, pleaded guilty to engaging know-
ingly in unlawful securities trading over a period of more than four years.
45
Prior to sentencing, Carucci moved for a downward departure pursuant to
section 5K2.13, claiming that "he committed his crimes while suffering
from a significantly diminished mental capacity attributable to a compulsive
gambling disorder."'146 Although the court acknowledged the medical com-
pulsion, and despite the fact that Carucci testified that he suffered from the
same "psychotic demons," at work as he did in other aspects of his life, the
court refused to grant the departure. The court made the distinction that "a
compulsive gambler is not a fortiori, a compulsive illegal trader.'
147
In United States v. Stevens, the defendant was charged with one count
of possession of child pornography, in a case factually very similar to
McBroom. 148 Despite the fact that a medical expert testified that the defen-
dant was "compulsive in his on-line forays," the court refused to depart pur-
suant to section 5K2.13.149 Among other factors, the court looked to the de-
fendant's apparent ability to have a "very full leisure life," as justification
for its conclusion that he was not volitionally impaired. 150 Interestingly, the
Third Circuit was not persuaded by this very rationale in McBroom, ulti-
mately dismissing McBroom's outwardly normal and productive life, and
finding him volitionally impaired nonetheless.
151
Finally, in United States v. Bennett, the defendant pled nolo contendere
to various charges of fraud. 152 Based on his belief that he was on a God-
144 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 292 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 1999).
145 See id. at * 1.
146 Id.
147 Id. at *3.
148 29 F. Supp. 2d 592 (D. Alaska. 1998).
149 Id. at 609.
150 Id.; see also infra notes 197-201 and accompanying text.
151 United States v. McBroom, 124 F.3d 533, 550 (3d Cir. 1997) ("We note... that an
individual's average or above-average mental capacity in one aspect of his or her affairs is not
necessarily relevant to a determination about the individual's mental capacity in another as-
pect.").
152 9 F. Supp. 2d 513, 516 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
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ordained mission, the defendant devised, developed, and managed what be-
came an extremely large financial enterprise that ultimately owed in excess
of $100 million to its unfortunate "investors."' 153 Because of inconclusive
medical testimony concerning the medical competency of the defendant, the
sentencing judge was left with little guidance. Ultimately, in light of the
judge's overall sense from the evidence, and pursuant to the authority vested
by McBroom, the judge granted a departure without definitive proof that the
defendant was volitionally impaired.
154
These cases illustrate the crucial problem that exists with the standard
proposed by McBroom, and now adopted by the Sentencing Commission:
there is a complete lack of a reliable metric for assessing volitional impair-
ment. That fact causes equal concern, whether it is being used as part of a
test for an affirmative insanity defense, or whether it is part of a standard for
determining reduced mental capacity in sentencing. The Carucci court eas-
ily could have justified a departure on the ground that the compulsive disor-
der affected the defendant's role as a trader; it simply chose not to do so.
The Stevens court, similarly, could have justified a departure. Finally, the
Bennett court perfectly illustrated how baffling such decisions can be with-
out clear guidance.
Indeed, research suggests that all too often "departure is driven by the
sentencing judge's desire to reach a result different from that specified in
the Guidelines, rather than by the presence of meaningfully atypical
facts., 155 Accordingly, the suggestion has been made that "[t]he Commis-
sion [should] improve its efforts to articulate clear and sensible policies un-
derlying Guidelines provisions; these efforts are necessary to build consen-
sus and provide clearer guidance to both district and appellate judges
regarding the situations in which departure is appropriate."'
15 6
153 See id. at 517-18.
154 See id. at 527 ("Regardless on one's point of view, defendant's cognitive faculties or
volition, or both, appear to have been subject to some form of extraordinary distortion and,
perha s, significantly reduced capacity." (emphasis added)).
Michael S. Gelacak et al., Departures Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: An
Empirical and Jurisprudential Analysis, 81 MINN. L. REv. 299, 364 (1996); cf United States
v. Goossens, 84 F.3d 697, 704 (4th Cir. 1996) (suggesting that a downward departure under
section 5K2.13 could depend on the defendant's "substantial assistance" to police); United
States v. Cantu, 12 F.3d 1506, 1509 (9th Cir. 1993) (granting a downward departure under
section 5K2.13 to a Vietnam War hero).
156 Gelacak et al., supra note 155, at 365. The need for clear and sensible policies is am-
plified by the fact that sentencing courts have discretionary authority to depart from the
Guidelines sua sponte. See Selya & Kipp, supra note 33, at 12 (explaining that Congress cre-
ated a system of limited appeals of sentences in federal courts to "safeguardI the residual dis-
cretion of the sentencing judge").
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The Third Circuit's intentions may have been well founded when it
boldly decided McBroom. 57 Yet, in so doing, it inadvertently opened the
door to fairly broad sentencing discretion, at least in the area of diminished
capacity departures. Between the authority vested in sentencing judges by
Koon v. United States, to consider the merits of all departures, and the
power now granted by the Commission to depart based on the oft-
misunderstood concept of volitional impairment, the remnants of indetermi-
nate sentencing are beginning to reappear. Although sentencing judges may
cherish this relatively unfettered degree of discretion in the area of section
5K2.13, it stands to seriously undermine Congress's goal of reducing sen-
tencing disparities, one of its main objectives in enacting the SRA.
3. Volitional Impairment and the Potential for Abuse
In McBroom, the Third Circuit considered the most obvious concern
about allowing section 5K2.13 departures based on volitional impairment,
namely the possibility of reduced sentences for any defendant who "'felt
compelled' to commit a crime.' 158  The court reasoned that its decision
would not open any floodgates because there were numerous limitations al-
ready imposed on section 5K2.13 departures. The court explained:
[S]ection 5K2.13 requires that the reduced mental capacity be "significant" be-
fore a downward departure may be considered. Likewise, a departure, if
granted, should reflect the extent to which the offender's reduced mental ca-
pacity contributed to the commission of the offense.... [A] departure may not
be granted where the offense is not "non-violent," and a departure is not war-
ranted when the defendant's criminal history indicates a need for incarceration
to protect the public. In addition, the reduction in mental capacity may not be
the result of the offender's voluntary use of drugs or other intoxicants. Taken
together, the requirements of section 5K2.13 are not easily met. In addition,159
the district courts retain their discretion to deny a downward departure ....
Presumably, the Commission wholly endorses the Third Circuit's view
that these protections are sufficient. However, these heavily relied upon re-
strictions may not, in fact, be as stringent as they first appear. Consider the
requirement that an offense be "nonviolent" before a defendant may be eli-
157 The Third Circuit arguably exceeded the scope of its authority; by allowing volitional
impairment to serve as a valid criteria for section 5K2.13 departures, the court performed a
quasi-legislative function and encroached on the Commission's area of expertise. See Herten,
supra note 29, at 666 (echoing this point, and noting that "when a question arises as to
whether the guidelines take into consideration a given factor, the proper authority to consult is
the Sentencing Commission, not the individual judges").
158 United States v. McBroom, 124 F.3d 533, 549 (3d Cir. 1997).
159 Id. at 548 (citations omitted); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 5K2.13 (Policy Statement) (1997).
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gible for a section 5K2.13 departure.1 60  Several circuits have defined the
term "nonviolent offense" as any crime that does not have "as an element
the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force." 161 This stan-
dard tends to create a bright-line distinction between violent and nonviolent
offenses. 162 By contrast, other circuits have applied a more fact-specific in-
quiry to determine whether the underlying conduct was, indeed, nonvio-
lent. 63
The recent amendments to section 5K2.13164 essentially represent a
compromise approach to the circuit conflict over nonviolent offenses. The
new section 5K2.13 allows a diminished capacity departure in most cases; it
states, in relevant part, that a departure is not allowed where "the facts and
circumstances of the defendant's offense indicate a need to protect the pub-
lic because the offense involved actual violence or a serious threat of vio-
lence."
165
Note that even under the newly revised section 5K2.13, whether the of-
fense disqualifies a defendant from the possibility of departure is still a fact-
160 See generally Seth A. Travis, Comment, Guiding the Sentencing Court's Discretion:
A Proposed Definition of the Phrase "Non-Violent Offense" Under United States Sentencing
Guideline § 5K2.13, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRmuNoLoGY 530 (1996) (discussing a circuit split on
the definition of "non-violent offense" under section 5K2.13). This was certainly an issue
prior to the Sentencing Commission's recent amendments to section 5K2.13, and it is yet to be
seen whether or not the issue has been fully resolved.
161 Id. at 531 & n.8. These circuits interpret the phrase "non-violent offense" in section
5K2.13 to be the contrapositive of the term "crime of violence" under Guidelines section 4B1.
See id. at 531 & nn.9-10. Under this view, any crimes defined as violent under section 4B1.2
are not "non-violent offenses."
162 See, e.g., United States v. Poff, 926 F.2d 588, 589-91 (7th Cir. 1991) (denying a de-
parture for the "violent" crime of writing threatening letters to the President of the United
States, despite the fact that the defendant never intended to carry out her threats); United
States v. Russell, 917 F.2d 512, 517 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that the definition of "non-
violent offense" under section 5K2.13 is the contrapositive of "crime of violence" in section
4B1.2) (citing United States v. Gonzales-Lopez, 911 F.2d 542, 548 (11th Cir. 1990)); United
States v. Rosen, 896 F.2d 789, 791 (3d Cir. 1990) (same); United States v. Maddalena, 893
F.2d 815, 819 (6th Cir. 1989) (same).
163 See, e.g., United States v. Weddle, 30 F.3d 532, 540-41 (4th Cir. 1994) (affirming a
sentencing court's downward departure where the defendant mailed threatening communica-
tions to his wife's lover and tried to run him off the road); United States v. Chatman, 986 F.2d
1446, 1447 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (vacating a sentencing court's refusal to depart downward where
the defendant had committed an unarmed bank robbery); see also United States v. Philibert,
947 F.2d 1467, 1471-72 (11th Cir. 1991) (determining whether an offense was nonviolent
pursuant to section 5K2.13 without examining the definition found in section 4B1.2), implied
overruling recognized by United States v. Bonner, 85 F.3d 522, 527 (1 1th Cir. 1996) (holding
that the threatened use of force is a violent crime and thus not grounds for downward depar-
ture); United States v. Spedalieri, 910 F.2d 707, 711 (10th Cir. 1990) (same).
16 See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text (discussing the Guidelines and its re-
cent amendments).
165 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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specific inquiry. Accordingly, the list of volitionally impaired offenders
potentially entitled to departure may be very surprising. Bank robbers,
166
stalkers, 167 drug dealers, 168 felons in possession of firearms, 169 bank de-
frauders, 170 and others convicted of federal offenses 171 might be eligible for
reduced sentences if, on the particular facts and circumstances of each case,
the sentencing court decides that the charged crime is not actually violent
and does not involve a serious threat of violence.
This broad standard for characterizing the violent nature of the offense
will not only open the door to reductions in sentences in numerous cases
where mitigation is unwarranted, but it is likely also to create an increased
burden on the criminal justice system, with more defendants demanding
section 5K2.13 departures. Contrary to the Third Circuit's intuition, there-
fore, there is ample evidence that the floodgates will, indeed, be opened to
some extent now that volitional impairment has been added as a relevant
consideration under section 5K2.13.
Moreover, a recent empirical analysis of the Guidelines' departure
practices across the country indicates that "departure practices
[do] ... mirror applicable appellate jurisprudence." 172  Thus, because the
Commission now endorses volitional impairment as a factor in section
5K2.13 departures, it is essentially increasing the number of departures
granted by sentencing courts on such grounds. This is especially alarming
in light of the widespread misperceptions regarding the meaning of voli-
166 See, e.g., Chatman, 986 F.2d at 1448-54 (establishing that a bank robbery was non-
violent because the defendant was unarmed and had a significantly reduced mental capacity).
167 See, e.g., Weddle, 30 F.3d at 537-40 (establishing that stalking was nonviolent be-
cause the defendant was unarmed and had a significantly reduced mental capacity); see also
Poff, 926 F.2d at 589-93 (suggesting another possible nonviolent crime under a fact-specific
inqUi67).
See, e.g., United States v. Withers, 100 F.3d 1142, 1148 (4th Cir. 1992) (describing a
scenario whereby the court refused to depart downward for a defendant convicted of drug
dealing, not because the crime was violent, which is ordinarily a threshold question, but be-
cause the defendant was "able to absorb information in the usual way"); United States v.
Hamilton, 949 F.2d 190, 193 (6th Cir. 1991) (same).
169 See, e.g., United States v. Cantu, 12 F.3d 1506, 1513-14 (9th Cir. 1993) (suggesting
that felony possession of firearms may be nonviolent under a fact-specific inquiry).
170 See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 979 F.2d 396, 397 (6th Cir. 1992) (allowing a
downward departure in a case involving high-level bank fraud).
171 See e.g. United States v. Ruff, 948 F. Supp. 1351, 1359 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (noting that
although the defendant pled guilty to breaking into a United States post office, he is "eligible"
to receive a departure under section 5K2.13).
172 Gelacak et al., supra note 155, at 359.
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tional impairment, 173 an unfortunate reality that exponentially increases the
possibility for greater disparities in sentencing.
The Third Circuit itself recognized the potential for abuse stemming
from its decision to expand opportunities for departures under section
5K2.13. 74 Unfortunately, it overestimated the limiting effect of many of
the restrictions contained within that section of the Guidelines. It should be
clear by now that at least some of these perceived restrictions may actually
be loosened to allow federal offenders access to departures in some sur-
prising cases, depending upon the sentencing court's interpretation of the
facts.175 Affording sentencing courts the luxury of exercising even more
discretion, based on a generally unclear understanding of volitional impair-
ment, only invites more uncertainty and ambiguity than can possibly be
good for the system.
B. A ProposedAlternative for Section 5K2.13 Departures: Back to the
Basics-Cognitive Ability
This Comment has demonstrated that the term volitional impairment, as
it is commonly understood and utilized, is inaccurate and misleading. It
does not represent literal involuntariness, and its use by sentencing courts is
likely to severely frustrate Congress's main objectives for federal sentenc-
ing reform. But, if volitional impairment cannot be a touchstone for section
5K2.13 departures, then what should such departures be based upon? The
answer is to continue to rely on the usual measure of defendants' mental ca-
pacities, namely the standard test for cognitive ability.
176
Concentrating solely on a defendant's ability to reason, or to appreciate
right from wrong, is preferable over trying to assess volitional impairment
on many levels. First, all of the cases which raise the greatest perceived
need to depart under volitional impairment theories could also be grounded
on cognitive impairment. Recall the typical hard choice scenario, for exam-
173 See supra Part III (explaining how people miscomprehend the true meaning of the
terma).4
See United States v. McBroom, 124 F.3d 533, 548-49 (3d Cir. 1997) (discussing
limitations on potential abuse); see also supra note 159 and accompanying text.
175 See supra notes 166-71 and accompanying text (describing a number of undesirable
exam ,les in which ajudge may conceivably depart downward pursuant to section 5K2.13).
See Daniel M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (H.L. 1843) (noting that dimin-
ished mental capacity exists where the defendant did not know the "nature and quality of the
act he was doing; or, if he did know it... he did not know he was doing what was wrong");
see also supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
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ple. 177 In such cases, a defendant wants to do something that she knows she
should not do, yet she feels compelled to do it anyway because the pain of
not doing it will cause dysphoria. 178 Arguably, it is "irrational to want to
produce unjustified harm so intensely that failure to satisfy that desire will
create" intolerable internal suffering. 179 Thus, the inquiry may be easily re-
defined as one focusing on rationality, rather than confounding things with a
concern over volitional impairment.
"Moreover, in a very small class of cases, such as kleptomania or nec-
rophilia, the agent's goal-described as theft for no reason or sexual desire
for the dead-may simply seem unintelligible or 'inappropriate' for any ra-
tionally motivated human being."'80 That the hardest volitional impairment
cases ultimately may be collapsed into questions of cognitive ability has led
Professor Morse to conclude that "[o]ut-of-control agents should sometimes
be excused, but not because they do not choose what they do. These cases
are better analyzed directly in terms of ordinary justifications for excusing
[or mitigating] conditions, such as irrationality and coercion... ,,181
Emphasizing the defendant's ability to reason is simply a purer and
less-problematic approach to the ultimate question being asked in a section
5K2.13 analysis, namely, does the defendant suffer from reduced mental
capacity to a significant degree so as to justify mitigation of punishment?
Where there are no rationality concerns, a volitionally impaired defendant
will be seeking mitigation for conduct that in actuality was voluntary and
intentional. No matter how tragic the surrounding circumstances might be,
and in spite of legitimate medical diagnoses, the actions will generally be
the product of a free and operative will.182 Thus, unmitigated punishment
will be both appropriate and morally justified. 8 3 Furthermore, whereas de-
partures based on volitional impairment may frustrate federal sentencing
objectives, 8 4 mitigation based on rationality defects is well-established in
the law and is wholly compatible with any theory of criminal punishment.
177 See supra notes 61, 104-06 and accompanying text (revisiting as a hard choice, case
six from Part II.A: "[S]omeone offers you something you want even more than not to raise
your leg if only you raise it, so you do.").
178 See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
179 Morse, supra note 27, at 1634.
180 Id.
181 Id. at 1605.
182 See supra Part II.B.5 (maintaining, for example, that hard choice defendants really do
have a choice).
183 See supra Part IV.A.1 (explaining that because people have free will, they bear moral
responsibility for their crimes, and thus their sentences should not be reduced).
184 See supra Part IV.A.2.
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Because the standard for cognitive impairment is widely understood
and has been applied by federal courts for some time, reliance on it also
avoids the potential abuses of discretion presented by allowing sentencing
courts to consider volitional impairment as a basis for departure.1ls As long
as the defendant is able to appreciate the wrongfulness of her conduct, sen-
tencing judges will not be able to consider whatever may have possibly
"compelled" the defendant to engage in the reproachable conduct. At least
for purposes of section 5K2.13 departures, that inquiry would be irrelevant,
and uniformity in sentencing would be better protected from serious flood-
gate concerns.
Exclusive reliance on a defendant's cognitive ability in the context of
section 5K2.13 departures is also preferable because such an approach
would be consistent with the related federal insanity defense. Congress ex-
pressly discarded volitional impairment for purposes of an affirmative in-
sanity defense through passage of the IDRA.18 6 By rejecting a volitional
prong as part of the insanity test, Congress demonstrated its lack of confi-
dence in psychologists' and others' capacities to measure volitional impair-
ment in defendants with any degree of reliability and accuracy.'87 These
important concerns do not dissipate for purposes of federal sentencing, and
there remains no credible way of measuring volitional impairment.
In light of the foregoing points, it came as a surprise that the Commis-
sion embraced the Third Circuit's reasoning in McBroom without reserva-
tion. The Third Circuit stood virtually alone in permitting a reduced mental
capacity departure to be based exclusively on a defendant's asserted voli-
tional impairment.188 Moreover, the Commission had addressed the ques-
tion on several occasions, rejecting proposals to include a volitional prong
within section 5K2.13 multiple times in the past.189 Nevertheless, the Sen-
tencing Commission has issued its revisions, and it is now up to Congress to
remedy the situation.
Every other circuit that had ruled on a sentencing departure pursuant to
section 5K2.13 considered a defendant's cognitive ability to reason as the
185 See supra Part IV.A.3.
186 See supra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing the IDRA).
187 See supra note 27 and accompanying text (noting that psychologists do not have suf-
ficient confidence in their own ability to accurately measure volitional impairment).
188 The Third Circuit realized its isolation, noting that: "It thus appears that, for some of
our sister courts of appeals, an individual's inability to reason or to absorb information in the
usual way is [the sole basis for section 5K2.13 departures] .... [I-Iowever, we cannot agree
to such a narrow reading of the guidelines." United States v. McBroom, 124 F.3d 533, 547
(3d Cir. 1997).
189 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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"sine qua none of reduced mental capacity."'' In United States v. Ed-
wards,191 for instance, the D.C. Circuit rejected the defendant's arguments
that mental capacity has a meaning apart from intellectual capacity.
192
Likewise, in United States v. Barajas-Nunez,193 the Sixth Circuit concluded
that "diminished mental capacity is found where a defendant's condition af-
fects his ability to process information or to reason." 194 The Fourth Circuit
followed suit in United States v. Withers,195 where it held that a defendant
was ineligible for a downward departure because she failed to show that her
depression rendered her unable to process information or to reason.
196
In United States v. Johnson,197 that Sixth Circuit steadfastly refused to
depart pursuant to section 5K2.13 absent any showing of cognitive impair-
ment of the defendant. 19  There, a senior bank executive pleaded guilty to
mail fraud in connection with a scheme to defraud his bank of millions of
dollars. He had been diagnosed with "Severe Adjustment Disorder," which
stemmed from prior negative personal experiences and which he claimed
had caused him to engage in the illegal activity.199 In rejecting the defen-
dant's argument for departure, the court reasoned that a defendant who
"displayed considerable mental agility in his professional and personal af-
fairs" was able to process information and to reason such that he was ineli-
gible for a section 5K2.13 departure. 20 Moreover, the court added that such
a case "does not present a situation 'sufficiently unusual' to justify [a re-
duced mental capacity] departure."
201
Applying the traditional standard for reduced mental capacity in
McBroom would obviously have produced a different outcome regarding
the decision to depart.202 This fact, coupled with the defendant's tragically
190 McBroom, 124 F.3d at 547.
191 98 F.3d 1364 (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1437 (1997).
192 See id. at 1371 ("If such a psychological or behavioral disorder serves as the basis for
the [diminished capacity] departure, however, there must be an accompanying inability to rea-
son-.'l
91 F.3d 826 (6th Cir. 1996).
194 Id. at 831.
195 100 F.3d 1142 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1282 (1997).
196 See id. at 1148 ("Most importantly, there was no evidence that Withers' depression
affected her ability to reason or process information.").
197 979 F.2d 396 (6th Cir. 1992).
198 See id. at 400-01 (holding that the defendant's ability to reason makes him ineligible
for a downward departure under section 5K2.13).
199 See id. at 400.
200 Id. at 401.
201 Id.
202 In fact, the sentencing judge at the trial level initially refused to depart under the cog-
nitive ability standard. The case was appealed to the Third Circuit on the grounds that the
[Vol. 147:729
REJECTING VOLITIONAL IMPAIRMENT
disturbing personal background,20 3 may have been what ultimately swayed
the Third Circuit to reverse the sentencing court and to introduce volitional
impairment into the realm of section 5K2.13 departures. However noble
that intent, the Commission's adoption of the McBroom standard must ulti-
mately be rejected on many grounds, as this Comment has demonstrated.
Instead, a better approach is to focus solely on a defendant's ability to ap-
preciate the wrongfulness of her conduct, and to hope that those who are ra-
tional seek help in maintaining their self-control, or else suffer the rightful
consequences.
CONCLUSION
The Commission was ill-advised to introduce a standard as unclear and
with as troubled a history as "volitional impairment" into the ambit of sec-
tion 5K2.13 departures. Such a move will likely lead to inadvertent abuses
of discretion by sentencing courts that might mitigate sentences on the mis-
perception that agents were metaphorically out-of-control, and thus, some-
how less culpable. It is also a step toward reversing the general trend away
from considering volition as a factor in any federal case.
In light of these concerns, a substantially better approach to sentencing
departures based on reduced mental capacity under the Guidelines is to rely
exclusively on a determination of the defendant's cognitive ability. Where a
defendant possesses the ability to reason, that is, to appreciate the wrongful-
ness of her behavior, then to mitigate her sentence based on volitional im-
pairment would not only frustrate key sentencing reform objectives, but
would also be morally irresponsible. It is now up to Congress to once again
assume the lead in rejecting a standard as unreliable as volitional impair-
ment once and for all.
district court should not be constrained to this analysis alone, but should have also been able
to consider volitional impairment under section 5K2.13. See supra notes 10-13 and accompa-
nying text (detailing the reasons for the district court's refusal to depart).
See supra note 4 and accompanying text (describing the abuse McBroom suffered as a
child, his bouts with drugs and alcohol, and his states of depression).
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